In this work we consider the Di e-Hellman Public-key model in which an additional short random string is shared by all users. This, which we call Public-Key Public-Randomness (PKPR) model, is very powerful as we show that it supports simple non-interactive implementations of important cryptographic primitives.
Introduction
In Private-Key Cryptography interaction is an essential resource. If two parties want to communicate secretly, they have to meet and agree on a common secret key. The need to establish a common key, before any communication could take place, severely limits the usefulness of this paradigm. Nonetheless it had been considered necessary for any form of secret communication.
The Public-Key model, introduced by Di e and Hellman 23], suggests an elegant and e cient way to eliminate the need for preliminary secure interaction which is essential in Private-Key Cryptography. Each party A publishes in a public le his encryption key and keeps secret his decryption key. Once the public le has been established, each user can receive and send any number of encrypted messages on a public channel from and to any other user that has access to the public le.
The security of this scheme rests upon the very natural assumption that only limited computational resources are available to each user and to a potential eavesdropper. The introduction of complexity-theoretic considerations in Cryptography caused much excitement and made possible protocols never thought of before. Most notably, the Oblivious Transfer protocol of Rabin (see 35] ) and the Zero-Knowledge Proof System of 34] and 30].
Oblivious transfer is a protocol for two parties called the sender, who has a bit b, and the receiver. At the end of the protocol either the receiver learns the bit b or he gains no information about b, with each of the two possibilities being equally probable. On his part, the sender has no information about which of the two events has occurred. Surprisingly, oblivious transfer is su cient for more complex and sophisticated cryptographic protocols such as secret key exchange and secure circuit evaluation 37].
A zero-knowledge proof is a two-party protocol, too. Here, a non trusted prover wants to convince a veri er of the validity of a certain input statement without releasing any additional knowledge. It has been proved that all NP statements can be proven in a zero-knowledge fashion.
The need of reducing the communication complexity of basic cryptographic primitives has lately emerged as a major research area. In fact, all of the new protocols made possible by the complexity-based approach to Cryptography have been implemented relying heavily on the possibility of communication between the parties involved. This is somewhat in contrast with the main motivation of the introduction of Complexity into Cryptography as a mean to reduce communication in the basic primitive of secure message-sending. Oblivious Transfer and Zero Knowledge have enjoyed di erent fortunes in this respect. In fact, recently, the study of models where non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are possible has received much attention (see, e.g . 7] and 8]) while the same cannot be said for Oblivious Transfer. Bellare and Micali 2] have been the only ones to consider a non-interactive implementation of Oblivious Transfer in a public-key setting. They propose an implementation of Oblivious Transfer based on the discrete log assumption that is secure with respect to an all-powerful sender and a probabilistic polynomial-time receiver. In this paper we give the dual result based on a di erent complexity assumption.
Before going any further a distinction is in order. In the design of zero-knowledge proofs, we have to take into account that both the prover and the veri er might deviate from the assigned protocol. A dishonest prover might try to cheat the veri er into accepting a false statement; while a dishonest veri er might try to gain more knowledge than the mere fact that the statement in question is true. Di erent avors of zero-knowledge are obtained depending on the computational power that dishonest parties are given. A computational zero-knowledge proof is secure against an in nitely powerful dishonest prover and is zero-knowledge with respect to polynomial-time veri ers. In other words, no prover (no matter how powerful) can convince the veri er with non negligible probability that a false statement is true while the proof may not be secure if the veri er is not restricted to probabilistic polynomial-time. For example, in the zero-knowledge proof for 3COL of 30], a veri er that is able to invert the speci c one-way function employed by the prover can compute the 3-coloring used in the proof.
On the other hand, a statistical zero-knowledge proof is secure against an in nitely powerful veri er. Unfortunately, no statistical zero-knowledge proof for an NP-complete language is known and there is strong evidence suggesting that NP-complete languages do not possess statistical zero-knowledge proofs 28, 9] .
A zero-knowledge argument 11] is a protocol secure only against provers bounded to probabilistic polynomial-time computations. That is, a prover with enough power could cheat the veri er. But what do we gain in doing this? Surprisingly, it turns out that all NP languages have interactive statistical zero-knowledge arguments 11]; that is, we are able to trade the prover's increased safety by decreasing the veri er's security. Despite the fact that the soundness is guaranteed only with respect to probabilistic polynomial-time provers, arguments can be used in cryptographic applications as in this case all parties are probabilistic polynomial-time machines and thus we don't have to worry against all-powerful adversaries. Another important practical aspect of the notion of argument is the following. Both for proofs and arguments if the computational assumption on which they are based turns out to be ill-founded the corresponding party can cheat the other (either get more knowledge or convince the other of a false theorem). However, while for proofs this attack can be carried o -line, for arguments it has to be performed on-line. That is, in an argument, a prover can cheat the veri er only if it breaks the computational assumption before or during the protocol and not after. Instead, the attack to extract more knowledge from a computational zero-knowledge proof can be performed even after the proof has been completed.
Until now, the study of non-interactive zero-knowledge has almost exclusively considered computational zero-knowledge proofs for NP (see 7, 26, 19] ). Damg ard 17] gave a potential solution based on the discrete log assumption to the problem of constructing statistical zero-knowledge arguments in the shared-string model for an NP-complete language. The soundness of the proposed construction is based on the existence of \su ciently random-looking" hash functions. No construction of these functions based on a natural complexity assumption is known. A protocol for statistical zero-knowledge argument for NP requiring a constant number of rounds is due to Brassard, Cr epeau, and Yung 13].
Summary of the results. We consider the Di e-Hellman model in which a short random string is shared by all users. We call this model the Public-Key Public-Randomness Model (PKPR Model). The set up of the PKPR Model does not require any preprocessing stage: each user chooses and validates by himself his own public and private keys without interacting with the other users. That is, no trusted center or distributed fault-tolerant computation (in the sense of 31, 3, 15] ) is ever invoked to protect against possible \cheating" by users who select their own public keys. Even though interaction is never allowed, the PKPR Model is very powerful as we show that important cryptographic primitives have simple non-interactive implementations in this model. The PKPR model is inspired by the model presented in 2].
We give a completely non-interactive implementation of Oblivious Transfer in the PKPR model. This is the rst non-interactive implementation of Oblivious Transfer that does not require a trusted center or some distributed fault-tolerant computation and is secure against receivers with unlimited computing power. Our implementation is essentially optimal. Indeed, a result of Ostrovsky and Yung 40] shows that it is not possible to achieve a non-interactive Oblivious Transfer from scratch. We give the rst implementation of non-interactive nature for Perfect Zero-Knowledge Arguments for all NP-languages. Our result uses our non-interactive implementation of Oblivious Transfer. However, we would like to point out at this point that, for some subtle technical reasons, the simple replacing of interaction with Oblivious Transfer does not work in this context. Indeed some extra non trivial ideas are needed in order to obtain zero-knowledge arguments. Unlike previous implementations of non-interactive statistical zero knowledge with a common random string, our implementation is very simple and, most notably, allows any number of provers to be active. No statistical zero-knowledge proof with this property is known (not even the ones for speci c number-theoretic languages of 7]). Our results are based on the well known and widely used Quadratic Residuosity Assumption, and they demonstrate the added value of short Public Randomness in the context of Public-Key Cryptography.
Background and Notations

Basic de nitions.
We denote by N the set of natural numbers. If n 2 N, by 1 n we denote the concatenation of n 1's. We identify a binary string with the integer x whose binary representation (with possible leading zeroes) is .
By the expression jxj we denote the length of x if x is a string, the length of the binary string representing
x if x is an integer, or the absolute value of x if x is a real number. By the expression x y we denote the concatenation of x and y, if x and y are strings, or the composition of x and y, if they are permutations. We say that a function f( ) is negligible if for all constants c there exists an integer n c such that for all integers n > n c it holds that f(n) < n ?c .
Algorithms and probability spaces. An algorithm is a Turing machine. An e cient algorithm is a probabilistic Turing machine running in expected polynomial time. A sequence of probabilistic Turing machines fT n g n N is an e cient non-uniform algorithm if there exists a positive constant c such that, for all su ciently large n, T n halts in expected n c steps and the size of its program is at most n c .
If A( ) is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input x, the notation A(x) refers to the probability space that assigns to the string the probability that A, on input x, outputs . Instead, the notation A(c; x) refers to the output of A when run on input x and using c as coin tosses.
If S is a probability space, then \x S" denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element randomly selected according to S. If F is a nite set, then the notation \x F" denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element selected according to the probability space whose sample space is F and uniform probability distribution on the sample points. If S is a probability space over strings, then by Pr S ( ) we denote the probability assigned by S to the string .
If p( ; ; ) is a predicate, the notation Pr(x S; y T; ::: : p(x; y; )) denotes the probability that p(x; y; ) will be true after the ordered execution of the algorithms x S; y T; :::.
The notation fx S; y T; : (x; y; )g denotes the probability space over f(x; y; )g generated by the ordered execution of the algorithms x S; y T; .
Number Theory
By Z x we denote the multiplicative group of the positive integers less than x and relatively prime to x.
An element y 2 Z x is a quadratic residue modulo x i there is a w 2 Z x such that w 2 y mod x. If this is not the case we call y a quadratic non residue modulo x. We de ne the quadratic residuosity predicate as QR x (y) = 0 if y is a quadratic residue modulo x and 1 otherwise. For p prime, the problem of deciding quadratic residuosity coincides with the problem of computing the Legendre symbol. In fact, for p prime and y 2 Z p , the Legendre symbol (yjp) of y modulo p is de ned Euler's criterion and the following fact give an e cient algorithm for deciding quadratic residuosity modulo integers of known factorization. In case the factorization is not known, some hints about the quadratic residuosity can be given by the Jacobi symbol de ned as
where x = k i=1 p hi i and the p i 's are prime and the h i 's are positive integers. Surprisingly, the Jacobi symbol can be computed in polynomial time even if the factorization of x is not given. Now, if (yjx) = ?1, then y is certainly a quadratic non residue modulo x. However, no e cient algorithm is known for deciding quadratic residuosity if the Jacobi symbol is +1. In this case, the fastest way known consists of rst factoring x and then compute QR x (y). We use it in this paper with respect to the following special moduli. We denote by Z +1
x the set of integers y 2 Z x such that (yjx) = +1 and by QR x and NQR x the sets of quadratic residues modulo x and quadratic non residues modulo x with Jacobi symbol +1.
Blum integers. An integer x is a Blum integer if and only if x = p k1 q k2 , where p and q are di erent primes both 3 mod 4 and k 1 and k 2 are odd integers. By BL we denote the set of Blum integers and by BL(n) the subset of Blum integers product of two primes (i.e., k 1 = k 2 = 1) congruent to 3 modulo 4 both of length n. Blum integers were introduced in Cryptography by 4]. There exists an e cient algorithm that, on input 1 n , outputs the factorization of a randomly selected x 2 BL(n). The algorithm randomly generates integers of length n congruent to 3 mod 4 until two primes are found (the primality is tested using the algorithm of Adleman and Huang 1]) and x is set equal to their product. By the density of primes congruent to 3 mod 4 (de la Valle Poussin's extension of the prime number theorem 41]), the expected number of integers of length n tested until two primes congruent to 3 mod 4 are found is polynomial in n. where denotes the logical exclusive or.
Moreover, if x is a Blum integer, ?1 is a quadratic non residue with Jacobi symbol +1 modulo x. This property makes the selection of a random element of NQR x very easy: just pick r 2 Z x at random and output ?r 2 mod x.
The class of Blum integers product of two primes of the same length constitutes the hardest input for any known e cient factoring algorithm and this justi es the following Quadratic Residuosity Assumption (QRA): For each e cient non uniform algorithm Q = fQ n g, all constants d, and all su ciently large n, Pr x BL(n); y Z +1 x : Q n (x; y) = QR x (y) < 1=2 + n ?d :
That is, no e cient algorithm can guess the value of the quadratic residuosity predicate substantially better than by random guessing. This assumption has been used for the rst time by 33] and is now widely used in Cryptography. For instance, the proof system for 3SAT of 7] is based on it.
An encryption scheme based on quadratic residuosity. In their seminal paper 33], Goldwasser and Micali introduced a public-key encryption scheme whose security is based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. The public key of user B contains a random integer x B product of two primes of the same length and y B , a quadratic non residue modulo x B with Jacobi symbol +1. B's secret key consists of the prime factors of x B . To secretly send B an l-bit message m = m 1 m l , a user A encrypts each bit m i by computing c i = y mi B r 2 i mod x B , where r i is a randomly chosen element of Z x B . It is easily seen that c i is a quadratic residue if and only if m i = 0. This observation gives a very simple decryption algorithm: compute the quadratic residuosity of the c i 's he has received (this can be done in polynomial-time as x B 's factorization is known to B). What makes decryption possible in this scheme is the fact that y B is a quadratic non residue. In fact, should y B be a quadratic residue, then, independently of the value of m i , each c i is a randomly chosen quadratic residue, and therefore B has absolutely no information to recover the bits m i 's. This property will be used in the construction of our Oblivious Transfer protocol. In what follows, we will denote by GM E(x; y; m) the algorithm that returns a random encryption of m computed using the pair (x; y) and by GM D(p; q; c) the algorithm that returns the decryption of the ciphertext c computed using x's prime factors p and q.
Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer has been introduced by Rabin (see 35]), who gave an implementation (for honest players) based on the di culty of factoring. Oblivious Transfer is a protocol for two parties: the Sender who has a string s, and the Receiver. Each of the following two events is equally likely to occur at the end of the protocol.
The Receiver learns the string s. The Receiver does not get any information about s. Moreover, at the end of the protocol, the Sender does not know whether the Receiver got s or not. The wide applicability of the Oblivious Transfer was recognized since the early days of modern Cryptography; the paper by Blum 5] is an example of how Oblivious Transfer can be used to implement several other protocols.
A di erent avor of Oblivious Transfer, the 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer was later introduced by Even, Goldreich, and Lempel 24] . Here, the sender has two strings s 0 and s 1 . Each of the following two events is equally likely to occur at the end of a 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer:
The Receiver learns the string s 0 , and does not get any information about s 1 . The Receiver learns the string s 1 , and does not get any information about s 0 . The sender has no information on which string the receiver gets. It is clear that 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer can be used to implement an Oblivious Transfer. Cr epeau 16] established their equivalence in the interactive setting. In this paper we will consider the 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer and will denote the 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer by OT. The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we formally de ne what we mean by PKPR Oblivious Transfer and in Section 3.2 we give an implementation of PKPR Oblivious Transfer based on the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption.
PKPR Oblivious Transfer.
A PKPR Oblivious Transfer (PKPR OT, in short) is a quadruple of algorithms (Key Generator, Verify, Send, Receive). We call A and B the sender and the receiver, respectively, and assume the existence of a random string that can be read by both parties. The mechanics of a PKPR OT is the following. B constructs two channels Ch 0 ; Ch 1 , a validation Val and a secret key Key using algorithm Key Generator and publishes Ch 0 ; Ch 1 ; Val. Also, Key Generator returns a bit b that denotes which of the two channels is open (see the meaningfulness condition in the de nition below). We will refer to a pair of channels along with its validation as a public le for OT. Now, suppose that A has two strings (s 0 ; s 1 ) that he wants to obliviously transfer to B. First, A veri es B's public le by checking that Verify( ; Ch 0 ; Ch 1 ; Val)=VALID. If the public le has been constructed by Key Generator, then this test is passed with very high probability (see the veri ability condition below). Then A computes and sends B the two messages msg 0 = Send(Ch 0 ; s 0 ) and msg 1 = Send(Ch 1 ; s 1 ). To retrieve one of the two strings, B computes Receive(Key; msg b ) (see the meaningfulness condition below). Moreover, there is no way for B to construct a public le that has a non negligible probability of being declared valid by Verify and that allows B to obtain information on both strings sent by A (see the 1-out-of-2 condition below). On the other hand, A has no way of guessing better than at random which of the two channels is open (see the obliviousness condition below).
Receive 0 are in nitely powerful and since we quantify over all algorithms, this is without loss of generality. Similarly, the algorithm Key Generator 0 does not give any Key in output, as the algorithm Receive 0 can be in nitely powerful and thus compute Key by himself.
Also notice that the strings s 0 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 are chosen independently from the random string . A stronger condition is obtained by letting an adversary choose the strings s 0 ; s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 after seeing the string . We remark that our proposed solution satis es also this more stringent requirement.
Implementing Oblivious Transfer in the PKPR Model.
We show how to implement a (non-interactive) Oblivious Transfer in the PKPR setting. For our construction we need a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system for a particular number-theoretic language. In 7] a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system for quadratic non residuosity modulo Regular (2) integers was given. An integer is Regular (2) if it has exactly two distinct odd prime divisors and is not a perfect square (see 7]). Combining this proof system with the one for the language of Blum integers presented in 18], we can construct a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system (A,B) for the language of pairs (x; y), where x is a Blum integer and y is a quadratic non residue modulo x. (A,B) for moduli of length n needs a reference string of n 3 bits. Moreover, the program of the prover A can be performed in probabilistic polynomial time provided that x's factorization is available. The proof is obtained in a direct manner, that is without making use of reduction to 3SAT and, most importantly, the same string can be used by any number of users to certify their own public-key entry.
Following are the formal descriptions of the Key Generator algorithm and the Verify algorithm needed to initialize the public le and the Send and Receive algorithms to actually perform the OT.
Algorithm Key Generator( ) Input: An n 3 -bit reference string .
1. Construct channels and secret key.
Randomly select two n-bit primes p; q 3 mod 4 and set x = pq.
Randomly select z 2 Z +1 x and y 2 NQR x .
Construct validation.
Run the algorithm A on input (x; y) using the reference string and obtaining Proof as output. Proof: First of all, the above algorithms run in polynomial time. Notice that, in the algorithms Key Generator and Receive, x's factorization is known. Now we prove that properties 1-4 of a PKPR Oblivious Transfer also hold. Meaningfulness . Now, as y is a quadratic non residue then, by Fact 2, exactly one of z and zy mod x is a quadratic non residue and thus, by the properties of the encryption scheme, the corresponding string s i will be read by the receiver. Veri ability. If the channels are constructed by Key Generator, then x is a Blum integer, z has Jacobi symbol +1 modulo x and y is a quadratic non residue modulo x. Thus it follows from the completeness of (A,B) that Verify will output VALID with overwhelming probability. 1-out-of-2. Suppose that there exists an algorithm that violates the 1-out-of-2 condition. Two cases need to be considered. If y is a quadratic non residue modulo x and x is a Blum integer, then, by Fact 2, one of z and zy is a quadratic residue modulo x. Thus, for the properties of the encryption scheme GM E, no information about the string encrypted with a quadratic residue can be obtained from its encryption.
Suppose now that y is a quadratic residue modulo x or that x is not a Blum integer. In this case, for the soundness of the proof system (A,B), it follows that with very high probability the algorithm Verify will output NONVALID. Obliviousness. We prove that the existence of an e cient algorithm Adv which, for some d > 0 and in nitely many n, violates the obliviousness condition contradicts the QRA. As (A,B) is a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system, there exists an e cient simulator algorithm S for (A,B). On input a pair (x; y), where x is a Blum integer and y is a quadratic non residue modulo x, S generates a pair ( ,Proof) where is a random string of n 3 bits and Proof has the same distribution of A's output on input and (x; y). We exhibit an algorithm Q( ; ) that decides quadratic residuosity using Adv and S as subroutines.
Algorithm Q(x; z).
Input: x 2 BL(n); z 2 Z +1 Output: b.
Let us now compute Pr(x BL(n); z Z +1
x :Q(x; z)=QR x (z)). Suppose that QR x (z) = 1. Then, any string sent using Ch 1 will be received; that is b = 1. As Adv guesses b with probability at least 1=2 + n ?d , in this case Q is successful with the same probability. The same reasoning applies to the case QR x (z) = 0. Therefore, for in nitely many n, Pr(x BL(n); z Z +1
x : Q(x; z) = QR x (z)) 1=2 + n ?d that contradicts the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption.
Dependent Oblivious Transfers.
The same pair of channels Ch 0 ; Ch 1 can be used to perform many OT's. However, these OT's will not be independent as the outcome of one of them determines the outcome of all of them. This is useful when we want that only one of two strings is received and not even one single bit of the other is leaked. If j independent OT's are desired, it is enough to have j independently chosen z B 2 Z +1
x B in B's public key. The problem of obtaining j independent OT's using the same public key (whose size does not depend on j) has its own interest and is currently open (see also the Extensions and Open Problems section at the end). We start by describing the computational model for the prover and the veri er.
General Oblivious
We model the prover by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine, Prover, with six tapes: a read- For L 2 NP, the set WIT L is de ned as the set of all the pairs (x; w) such that R L (x; w) = 1 and jwj jxj c . Moreover, if (x; w) 2 WIT L then we say that w is a witness for x.
Next we formalize the concept of a PKPR Statistical Zero-Knowledge Argument. Informally, a PKPR pair is a PKPR Statistical Zero-Knowledge Argument for a language L if whenever x 2 L is given on the input tape and a witness w for x is provided on the auxiliary tape to the prover, then the veri er accepts with very high probability. On the other hand, if x 6 2 L then, regardless of the content of the auxiliary tape, no e cient prover can make the veri er accept with some non-negligible probability. Moreover, everything that the veri er sees can be reproduced by an e cient simulator S that can use Verifier as a subroutine. 2. Soundness. For all e cient non-uniform algorithms Adv= fAdv n g n2N such that Adv n on input a reference string of length n a and a public key PK outputs pairs (x; Proof ), with x 6 2 L and jxj = n, Pr ? f0; 1g n a ; (PK; SK) Verifier 1 ( ); (x; Proof ) Adv n ( ; PK) : Verifier 2 ( ; x; Proof ; PK; SK) = 1) < 2=3: 3. Statistical Zero Knowledge. Let V ( ; ) be any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm and d be any constant such that V stops after at most n d steps whenever its second input is of length n. Then, there exists a pair of e cient algorithms S V = (S 0 ; S 1 ) such that, for all constants d and all Notice that in soundness we require the probability of cheating to be smaller than 2=3. If a smaller probability of cheating is desired then the proof can be repeated using independently constructed public les. In the zero knowledge condition we let the view of the veri er include also his own random coin tosses.
The stronger notion of perfect zero knowledge is obtained by requiring that the two probability distributions S V (x) and View V (x; w) are equal for all (x; w) 2 WIT L .
Zero-Knowledge Arguments for all NP languages in the PKPR model
In this section we show how to obtain PKPR Statistical Zero-Knowledge Arguments for all NP languages. For our construction we need a bit commitment scheme and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that work also in the PKPR model.
Bit Commitment in the PKPR Model.
A bit-commitment protocol is a fundamental 2-party cryptographic protocol. It allows one party A to commit to a bit b by computing a commitment COM. Later, A can decommit the bit b by giving a decommitment key DEC. Any other party B that reads the string COM can not successfully guess b with probability better than 1=2. However, after receiving DEC and b, B can verify that b is the bit A has originally committed to. If B is restricted to be e cient, a bit commitment scheme can be implemented as follows: A chooses a secure encryption scheme (in the sense of 33]) and commits to a bit by encrypting it. To decommit b, A simply shows the random bits used for the encryption.
For our construction we actually need a bit-commitment scheme in which no limits are imposed on B's computing power. Thus the above would not work as B might be able to break the encryption. Instead, we use the unconditionally secure blobs of 10] for the commitment of A to B. B publishes in his public le a random integer x B 2 BL(n), s B a random quadratic residue modulo x B , and a non-interactive zeroknowledge proof that x B and s B are of the prescribed form (this is computed using the proof system of 18]). To commit to a bit b, A performs the procedure: (1) In what follows, we denote by BC the algorithm that commits to a bit. More precisely, BC receives as input a bit b, a Blum integer x, and s, a quadratic residue modulo x, and returns the pair (r; u) of decommitment and commitment keys. Instead, by VC we denote the algorithm that veri es the validity of a decommitment. That is, VC receives as input (x; s; u; r; b) and outputs 1 if and only if s b r 2 = u mod x.
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge.
A Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge is a protocol between two polynomial-time parties, a prover and a veri er. The prover wants to convince the veri er in zero knowledge that he knows the proof of a given theorem. This is di erent from Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Membership in which the prover convinces the veri er that the theorem holds The basic idea.
Our construction is based on the oblivious transfer of the previous section and the bit commitment described above. The intuitive idea is to replace the interaction in an interactive zero-knowledge proof system with oblivious transfer (this technique has been used by 38]). More precisely, we consider the proof system of Blum for Hamiltonian graphs 6]. Here, the prover commits to an isomorphic copy of the input graph and the veri er can choose between two challenges: either asks to open the commitment and thus verify that it is indeed an isomorphic copy of the input graph; or asks to show a Hamiltonian cycle in the committed graph by opening the commitments relative to the edges in the cycle.
Such a protocol seems to be easily adapted to a non-interactive setting provided that oblivious transfer and bit commitment are possible. In fact, the veri er need not to ask which challenge he wants to propose but instead the prover will obliviously transfer the decommitment keys for both the challenges. Because of the properties of oblivious transfer, the veri er will receive exactly one of the two sets of decommitments and the prover does not know which one will be received. Thus it seems that both soundness and zero knowledge should hold.
Zero Knowledge and Soundness: two subtle points.
However, things are a little more complicated and both zero knowledge and soundness require some more thoughts.
Let us consider zero knowledge rst. To prove the zero-knowledge property, for each possible veri er, we have to exhibit a simulator whose output has a distribution very close to what is seen by the veri er which includes also his random coin tosses. The rst thing that comes to mind is to use the well-known trial-and-error strategy. That is, the simulator is prepared to meet exactly one challenge of the two; if the veri er asks for the other challenge then he will start again until he is successful. In the interactive setting, the simulator knows which challenge has been requested by the veri er and whether the veri er has been satis ed by each of the challenges. In our case, the simulator does not know which challenge has been requested as the choice is implicitly made by the setting of the oblivious transfers channel made by the veri er. The only feedback he receives from the veri er is an ACCEPT/REJECT message which does not help much. Moreover, remember that the simulator has to output the coin tosses of the veri er and that we have to exhibit a simulator for each possible veri er. We circumvent this problem by having the veri er include in the public le a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that he knows the factorization of the modulus x for the oblivious transfer. In this way, the simulator can extract such knowledge and thus know for each channel what will be read by the veri er and prepare the commitments accordingly.
A similar problem arises for the soundness. A formal proof of the soundness requires that we exhibit an algorithm Q that receives in input a Blum integer x and a randomly chosen element z of Z +1
x and decides the quadratic residuosity of z modulo x by using a fraudlent prover (that is a prover that succeeds in cheating the veri er) as subroutine. The simplest thing would be to use the x and z to set up an oblivious transfer channel. But then, as we do not know x's factorization, we can not read the oblivious channel and thus gain nothing from doing this. What we do instead is to have the veri er establish two oblivious transfer channels with two di erent moduli; moreover, we require that the corresponding z's have the same quadratic residuosity modulo their respective moduli. In this way, algorithm Q sets up one channel using a randomly chosen modulus x with known factorization and the other using the modulus x and, as we shall see, by reading the channel relative to x it can gain information on the quadratic residuosity of z.
An informal description of the protocol.
We rst describe how the public le is constructed and then show how the proof is actually performed.
Construction of public le. The public le contains three public les: two are for oblivious transfer and one for bit commitment. Verifier 1 randomly chooses six primes p 1 ; q 1 ; p 2 ; q 2 ; p 3 ; q 3 3 mod 4 of the same length and sets x 1 = p 1 q 1 , x 2 = p 2 q 2 , x 3 = p 3 q 3 . Next, Verifier 1 randomly chooses s, a quadratic residue modulo x 3 ; y 1 , a random quadratic non residue modulo x 1 ; y 2 , a random quadratic non residue modulo x 2 ; and z 1 ; z 2 , elements of Z +1 x1 ; Z +1 x2 respectively. Thus, the public le is composed of the two public les for the oblivious transfer ((x 1 ; y 1 z 1 mod x 1 ) ; (x 1 ; z 1 ); ( 1 ; y 1 )) and ((x 2 ; y 2 z 2 mod x 2 ); (x 2 ; z 2 ); ( 2 ; y 2 )) ( 1 and 2 are proofs of correctness); the public le for bit commitment (x 3 ; s; 3 ) ( 3 is the proof of correctness); 4 , the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof that z 1 and z 2 have the same quadratic residuosity modulo x 1 and x 2 respectively; and by 5 and 6 , the zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of the factorization of x 1 and x 2 , respectively. The private key SK consists of the factorizations of x 1 and x 2 .
Proving that G is Hamiltonian. On input a Hamiltonian graph G and a Hamiltonian cycle for G, Prover proceeds as follows. First, he randomly selects a permutation of the vertices of G and computeŝ G = (G). Then, using s and x 3 , he computes a bit-by-bit commitment of the adjacency matrix of b G and sends them to the veri er. Let be the concatenation of the decommitment keys of the adjacency matrix of b G and let be the concatenation of the decommitment keys of the entries of the adjacency matrix of b G that correspond to edges in the Hamiltonian cycle of b G. Finally Prover obliviously transfers the pair ( ; ) by sending using the channels (x 1 ; y 1 z 1 mod x 1 ) and (x 2 ; y 2 z 2 mod x 2 ) and using the channels (x 1 ; z 1 ) and (x 2 ; z 2 ). Verifier 2 checks that he receives the same string on both channels and that either is formed by proper decommitment keys of the adjacency matrix of b G; or is formed by proper decommitment keys of the entries of the adjacency matrix of b G which correspond to the edges of a Hamiltonian cycle.
For constructing our pair (Prover,Verifier), we will use three proof systems (A,B), (C,D) and (F,H) as subroutines. (A,B) is a non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system for the language of pairs (x; y) such that x is a Blum integer and y is a quadratic non residue modulo x ( 7, 18]). (F,H) is instead a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of factorization. In 21], it is proved that the quadratic residuosity assumption is su cient for the existence of (F,H). Notice that (F,H) is computational zero-knowledge but this will be enough to obtain statistical zero-knowledge arguments. (C,D) is a noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge proof system for the language EQUAL of quadruples (x 1 ; x 2 ; z 1 ; z 2 ) such that x 1 ; x 2 are Blum integers and QR x1 (z 1 ) = QR x2 (z 2 ). In 18], the authors have presented a noninteractive perfect zero-knowledge proof system for the language OR of quadruples (x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 ) where at least one of y 1 and y 2 is a quadratic non residue modulo its respective modulus. The proof system (C,D) is constructed by observing that a quadruple (x 1 ; x 2 ; z 1 ; z 2 ) belongs to EQUAL if and only if both quadruples (x 1 ; x 2 ; ?z 1 mod x 1 ; z 2 ) and (x 1 ; x 2 ; z 1 ; ?z 2 mod x 2 ) belong to OR.
A formal description of a PKPR Statistical Zero-Knowledge Argument can be found in gures 2, 3, 4. Here by a; c; and f we denote the constants such that the proof systems (A,B), (C,D), and (F,H) on inputs of size n use strings of length at most n a ; n c ; n f . Now we can prove the following theorem. Proof: We shall prove that the pair (Prover,Verifier) meets the requirements of De nition 3. First of all, the above algorithms run in polynomial time. In fact, algorithms Verifier 1 and Verifier 2 use x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 's factorization to run in polynomial time the algorithms A, C and F, and to decide the quadratic residuosity of integers z 1 ; z 2 modulo respectively x 1 and x 2 . Algorithm Prover is trivially seen to be executed in polynomial time.
Completeness.
Suppose that G 2 HAM and consider the algorithm Verifier 2 . Obviously, 1 is always equal to 2 (see step 4 of Prover's program). Moreover, if z 1 is a quadratic non residue modulo x 1 then the string 1 is always of the right form ( 1 is actually the string computed by Prover at step 3 of its program). On the other hand, if z 1 is a quadratic residue modulo x 1 then, by Fact 2, y 1 z 1 mod x 1 is a quadratic non residue modulo x 1 (remember that y 1 is a quadratic non residue). Thus, in this case 1 is equal to the string computed by Prover at step 3 of its program and thus also in this case Verifier 2 accepts.
Soundness.
Soundness requires that no e cient non uniform algorithm Adv has probability of cheating greater than 2=3. We actually prove that no e cient non uniform algorithm has probability of cheating signi cantly better than 1=2.
Suppose, for sake of contradiction, that there exists a constant c > 0 and an e cient non uniform algorithm Adv that, for in nitely many n, on input a string of length 3n a + n c + 2n f and a public le PK, outputs a pair G; Proof with G 6 2 HAM that is accepted by Verifier 2 with probability greater than 1=2+ n ?c : Then, we exhibit an algorithm Q( ; ) that, using Adv as subroutine, on input a randomly chosen x 2 BL(n) and a randomly chosen element z 2 Z +1 x computes QR x (z) with probability no smaller than 1=2+1=8n c , for in nitely many n. Let us now informally describe algorithm Q. A formal description can be found in Figure 5 where we denote by T 1 ; T 2 , and T 3 the e cient simulators for (A,B), (C,D), and (F,H), respectively.
In order to use Adv, Q has to construct a public key PK for Adv. PK will include, among other things, the two public les for OT that we denote by PK 1 and PK 2 , and are built by Q in the following way. A bit b is chosen at random and PK 1+b is set equal to ((x; yz mod x); (x; z); ( ; y)), where y is randomly chosen quadratic non residue modulo x and is the output of the simulator for the proof system (A,B) on input (x; y). On the other hand, PK 2?b is set equal to (( x; y z mod x); ( x; z); ( ; y)) where x 2 BL(n) is chosen randomly along with its factorization, z is a random element of Z +1 x , y is randomly chosen quadratic non residue modulo x and is a proof, computed using algorithm A, that y is a quadratic non residue modulo x. After receiving Proof from Adv, Q runs the algorithm Receive on the pair of messages corresponding to the public le PK 2?b (the one for which Q knows the factorization of the modulus). Thus, Q knows which string would have been received by a veri er in both oblivious transfers (in fact the two strings have to be sent in the same order by Adv in the two oblivious transfers, otherwise the veri er rejects).
After running the algorithm Receive, two events can occur: (a) Q receives a meaningful string (i.e., the concatenation of the decommitment keys either for the bits of b G, or for the bits of a Hamiltonian cycle) in which case it outputs QR x ( z) as a guess for QR x (z) (see steps 6 and 7 of Q's program); (b) Q receives an arbitrarily constructed and meaningless string in which case it outputs 1 ? QR x ( z) as a guess for QR x (z) (see step 8 of Q's program). Now, in order to compute the probability of the two events, we distinguish two cases. Case 1. QR x1 (z 1 ) = QR x2 (z 2 ). If the public le PK were constructed exactly as Adv sees it when trying to deceive the veri er, then we could conclude that the probability that Q reads something meaningful, and thus gives the correct answer, is at least the probability that Adv makes the veri er accept that is at least 1=2 + n ?c .
However, in this case, PK does not have the same distribution even though the only di erence between the public le PK constructed by Q and a real public le seen by Adv is in the strings relative to the proof of knowledge of x's factorization; that is, depending on the random bit b, either ( 5 ; 1 ) or ( 6 ; 2 ) have a di erent distribution (remember (A,B) and (C,D) are perfect zero-knowledge proof systems).
Observe, though, that (F,H) is a zero-knowledge proof system and that T 3 is a simulator for (F,H). This implies that the distribution of the public le constructed by Q is indistinguishable to e cient algorithms from the distribution of the \real" public le. This implies that Q's output is indistinguishable from the output of the algorithm which feeds Adv with a public le PK with the right distribution. In fact, were this not the case, we would construct an algorithm to distinguish the output of the simulator T 3 from the real view, contradicting the zero-knowledgeness of (F,H).
Because of the discussion above, we conclude that in this case Q computes QR x (z) correctly with probability at least 1=2 + 1=2n c , for in nitely many n. Case 2. QR x1 (z 1 ) 6 = QR x2 (z 2 ).
Assume that QR x1 (z 1 ) = 0 (the other case is similar). If b = 0 then Q knows the factorization of x 2 and thus can read the string encrypted using z 2 . On the other hand, if b = 1 then Q knows the factorization of x 1 and thus can read the string encrypted using y 1 z 1 mod x 1 . As G 6 2 HAM, at least one of and must be a meaningless string. Thus the probability that Q reads a meaningful string (and thus guesses QR x (z) incorrectly) is not greater than the probability that Adv guesses the bit b. If PK had the same distribution of a real public le then this probability would be 1=2. Notice, however, that the public le PK constructed by Q di ers form the \real" public le only for the proof of knowledge of x 1+b 's factorization, the proof that z 1 and z 2 have the same quadratic residuosity and the relative reference strings. Therefore, for the zero-knowledgeness of (C,D) and (F,H) it follows that the probability that Adv guesses the bit b (and thus whether Q knows the factorization of x 1 or of x 2 ) is smaller than 1=2 + 1=4n c (actually it is smaller than 1=2 + n ?d for all constants d).
By observing that each case has probability 1=2 of occurring then we conclude that, for in nitely many n, Pr(x BL(n); z Z +1 x : Q(x; z) = QR x (z)) 1=2 + 1=8n c ; which contradicts the Quadratic Residuosity Assumption.
Zero Knowledge.
As (F,H) is a proof system of knowledge for the factorization, there exists a pair (Ext 0 ; Ext 1 ) of e cient extractor algorithms with the following properties. Ext 0 receives as input 1 n and gives in output two strings: and aux. The string is n f -bit long and its distribution, taken over the coin tosses of Ext 0 , is statistically close to the uniform distribution. Ext 1 receives as input , aux, an integer x and a proof of knowledge computed by a prover and outputs either the factorization of x (in which case we say that he had success) or NIL. The probability of success of Ext 1 , taken over the coin tosses of Ext 0 ; Ext 1 and of the prover, is exponentially close to the probability that the prover convinces the veri er.
To prove the zero-knowledge property, for each veri er V , we show an e cient simulator S V such that, for G 2 HAM, the probability space S V (G) is statistically close to the view of V . The algorithm S V uses Then, by running Ext 1 on input 1 , x 1 , aux, and 5 , S 0 computes x 1 's factorization and QR x1 (z 1 ). In this way it knows which of the two strings that will be obliviously transferred the veri er will read, and S 1 will prepare them accordingly. A formal description of S V is in Figure 6 . We notice that S 0 stops in expected polynomial time. In fact, because of the soundness property of (F,H), the probability that the veri er does not reject the proof and the extractor does not succeed in extracting the factorization is negligible. Thus with overwhelming probability Phase I is performed just once. Moreover, S 1 's program can be executed in probabilistic polynomial-time once the factorization of x 1 is known.
We prove now that the two probability spaces S V (G) and View V (G) are statistically close; that is, they satisfy the zero knowledge requirement. In our analysis we distinguish two cases depending on whether the public le PK provided by V has been properly constructed or not. Let us examine rst the case when V constructs PK correctly. By the properties of (F,H) the string 1 is statistically close to a random string and thus so is . Moreover, the u ij 's computed by S V are all random quadratic residues modulo x 3 just as in the output of the legitimate prover. Let us now look at the pair (msg 1 ; msg 2 ) (the same reasoning holds for the pair (msg 3 ; msg 4 )). In the view of the veri er the pair consists of two components: one is an encryption computed using a quadratic non residue modulo x 1 ; the other is just a sequence of random quadratic residues modulo x 1 . Exactly the same happens in the output of S V . Moreover the component that is not made of random quadratic residues encrypts meaningful information in both distributions; that is, either the decommitment keys relative to the edges of a random Hamiltonian cycle in b G or the decommitment keys of all edges in b G along with a random isomorphism from G to b G. Let us now consider the case when PK is not properly constructed. Then two cases are possible: S V realizes that at step 3 of Phase I (in which case the output of S V coincides with the view of the veri er) or S V does not realize it. In this second case we cannot say that S V 's output is identical to the view of the veri er but this does not compromise the statistical zero-knowledge property as this case occurs with a negligible probability (thanks to the soundness of the proof systems used).
Extensions and Open Problems
A more general result. The proof system that we have presented heavily uses the properties of the PKPR OT that we have presented in Section 3. However, we would like to remark that our construction of zero-knowledge arguments can be based on any PKPR OT for which it is possible to give a non interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the secret key and to prove that two pairs of channels are identical (i.e, either for both pairs the rst channel can be read or for both pairs the second channel can be read).
Perfect zero-knowledge. We have just described a statistical zero-knowledge argument for HAM. This system is not perfect zero-knowledge as the following two cases are never simulated by S V .
The rst case is when the veri er constructs the public le improperly but S 0 does not notice it. For example, a veri er might choose s as a quadratic non residue modulo x 3 and still have a positive (though negligible) probability that S 0 does not notice it. Then, the commitment of the graph b G has a quadratic non residue modulo x 3 for each entry 1 and a quadratic residue modulo x 3 for each entry 0. This is di erent from what S 1 constructs in the case z 1 is a quadratic non residue (see step 1.2 of S 1 's program). The situation is made more complicated by the fact that S 0 has no way of knowing whether the public le is correctly constructed or not.
This problem can be resolved by having the veri er give a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the factorization of the three moduli used in the construction. This way, S 0 can use the extractor of the proof system of knowledge and check directly whether the public le is constructed properly. In case it is not and it does not detect this by running the appropriate veri ers at step 3, it runs an O(n!) exaustive algorithm for nding a Hamiltonian cycle in the input graph G and then runs the prover's algorithm. To keep the expected running time of the simulator polynomial, we make sure that the probability that the veri er succeeds in cheating without getting caught is smaller than 1=n!. This is achieved by repeating the proofs of correctness with su ciently many (but still no more than polynomial) independent random strings.
A second reason for which the output of S V is not exactly the same as the view of the veri er is due to the following fact. It is possible that, even though the prover is convinced by the proofs of knowledge, the extractor fails to extract the factorizations of the moduli employed. In this case, which again has negligible probability of occurring, the simulator runs an exaustive algorithm for nding a Hamiltonian cycle in the input graph G. As above, we repeat the proof of correctness with su ciently many random strings so to keep the probability of cheating smaller than 1=n!.
We summarize the above discussion in the following theorem. Theorem 3. Under the QRA, all languages in NP have PKPR perfect zero-knowledge arguments.
Multiple independent provers and large theorems. For sake of ease of exposition, our de nition of zero-knowledge arguments only considers the case of a single prover which proves a single theorem (of length bounded by the length of the random string) to a single veri er. However we would like to remark that, as it can be easily veri ed by the reader, our proof system can handle any number of provers and any number of veri ers. Moreover, statistical zero-knowledge arguments for any theorem of length polynomial in the length of the reference string can be given.
Open problems. The obvious open problem suggested by our work is to reduce the complexity assumption needed for Oblivious Transfer and Zero-Knowledge Arguments.
Also of great interest, it would be to design a protocol for Oblivious Transfer that allows any polynomial number (in the length of the public le) number of independent oblivious transfers. The lack of independence in the oblivious transfer is a source of potential problems. In fact, the soundness of the system might be compromised if the veri er reveals whether he rejected or accepted a proof. This is similar to the problem of chosen ciphertext attack for cryptosystems. 
